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S E L E C T E D  I N D I C A T O R S   
 
 Q1 
2002 
Q2 
2002 
Q3 
2002 
Q4 
2002 
Year 
2002 
Q1 
2003 
Q2 
2003 
Jul 
2003 
Aug 
2003 
Trend 
2003 
GDP growth (quarterly, 
annualized), % 
3.1 5.7 4.5  4.9 4.4    ? 
Exchange rate Leu/USD, total 
interval, % 
4.1 1.8 - 1.1 1.3 6.02 - 0.93 -0.53 -0.67  ? 
Inflation, monthly average, % 3.9 5.1 2 6 17.8 1.3 0.8   ? 
Industrial output, monthly 
average %  
4.4 4.2 6.9 8.3 6.0 3.4 2.9   ? 
Trade deficit, FOB/CIF  
(million USD) 
759 1,003 948 1,279 3,988 820 1,748   ? 
Unemployment rate, % 13 9.6 8.2 8.1 8.1 8.3 8.1 6.9  ? 
Average net monthly salary, 
USD 
110 118 118 122 117 132 142   ? 
State pensioners / employees 1.01 1.011 1.013 1.02  1.06 1.07   ? 
Business confidence for the next 
3 months: output / contracts / 
jobs   (INSSE survey) 
   ?    
?    
? 
?    
?     
− 
?    
?     
? 
 
 
Trust in government, % 
(The current Government can 
improve things) 
45 38 32 
 
 
38 
 
31 
  
34 ? 
Pessimism, % 
(Country heading in the wrong 
direction) 
51 57 62  49 57  63 ? 
Subjective welfare, % 
(Better off than last year) 11 12 11  15 16  16 − 
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Abstract 
 
The ruling party, PSD, has abandoned its previous intentions to 
transform itself into a modern Social-Democratic movement – together 
with some of the people who were supposed to spearhead such 
changes, says the Politics section of this report.  The judicial reform has 
not progressed significantly in the twelve months since our last 
assessment, and we believe this has to do primarily with a lack of 
political will. As for the opposition, SAR suggests that only a tight and 
institutionalized party union between PNL and PD will be able to make 
a difference in the 2004 elections.  
Romania’s target date of admission in the European Union is 2007. At 
the last summit, in Thessalonica, the EU leaders restated their 
encouragement and support for Romania so that the country joins the 
Union by 2007. Likewise, they nudged the Romanian government to 
pursue relentlessly the necessary reforms with regard to industrial 
restructuring, public administration and the judiciary system. The 
Economy section presents a succinct overview of economic 
developments in Romania and the immediate prospects at the end of 
the first half of 2003. 
The data from the last year’s census have unleashed a wave of public 
angst and self-doubt about the fate of the nation. The Social section 
argues that such concerns are misplaced, and that what really 
matters are the government policies which in the last decade have 
contributed much more than the natural demographic trends to the 
current high dependency rate, for example. It is advisable to shift 
government policy so as to take into account these trends, especially 
by introducing incentives in the social insurance system to encourage 
people to contribute longer and rely less on public social security. 
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WARNING
 
 
 
 
 
1. POLITICS 
 
REFORM STALLED 
Government Party Slides Back To Its Ambiguous Past 
Romania’s government party has been engaged since 2000 in a 
visible effort to change its image at home and abroad. Willing to leave 
behind them the image of turncoat communists with barely disguised 
authoritarian tendencies the Social Democrats followed a twofold 
strategy. First, they recruited a number of technocrats in key 
negotiation positions with the West (ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Finance, negotiator of EU accession). Second, they employed a young 
bureaucrat with private sector credentials (Cozmin Guşă) mandated 
to reform the party and transform it into a modern social-democratic 
movement. The authority of such people was designed to proceed 
from the Prime Minister, in his double capacity as a head of 
government and party leader. Besides this informal empowerment, 
none of the pro-Western actors did enjoy – or receive – real power in 
the party.  
While the ministers and the PM were busy with governing and Guşă 
with improving the party image, the networks of influence within PSD 
took more and more control of the party machine. Granted impunity 
by the premier despite credible media allegations on their corruption, 
the regional ‘barons’ of PSD have turned the organization into a 
collection of clans. In July they managed to oust Guşă, the secretary 
general, who had been instrumental in rallying a few credible opinion 
leaders and politicians to the government’s camp. The secretary 
general was first offered an executive position, which would have 
ended his formal task of chief party reformer; when he turned it down, 
his office was stripped of its powers and left with ceremonial 
attributions only. Upon his departure, he suggested that 
“undemocratic” and allegedly corrupt characters like Dan Ioan 
Popescu, the Economy minister, Miron Mitrea, the Infrastructure 
minister, and Viorel Hrebenciuc, a prominent PSD parliamentarian, 
should also step down. Unsurprisingly, none did, despite evidence 
being published by the leading Romanian daily, Adevărul, accusing 
Hildegard Puwak, Minister of European Integration, of being involved in 
conflict of interest (both her husband and son have four companies 
which ran programs through the Leonardo program after she was 
appointed minister in early 2001).  
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Judicial Reform Buried in Scandal 
It is not only the PSD internal restructuring which is at stake here. The 
reform of PSD is a private business – the reform of the country, 
especially in view of the EU accession, is of public interest. While the 
economy seems to be on the right track and the government hires 
lobby groups to advocate for the status of a functional market 
economy, signs from sensitive sectors, such as justice, raise doubt on 
the political will to accomplish substantive changes. A year after this 
report examined the reform of the judiciary the progress is meager. The 
draft law on the organization of the Superior Council of Magistrates 
(CSM), the key issue for ensuring the true independence of the 
judiciary, was still not made public and discussed with the civil society 
and international donors. Worse, the behavior of the barely renovated 
CSM (which produced a document in July attacking the President of 
the Supreme Court of Justice for ‘human rights abuse’, meaning the 
call to order of a prosecutor in a trial) shows that the Council will be 
allowed to gain strength only to the extent that its composition can be 
controlled. In effect, it will replace the Ministry of Justice as a more 
discrete form of political control over the judiciary.  
Fig. 1. Reform of the judiciary 
 Current legal 
situation 
Current practice Proposed reforms 
Extraordinary 
appeals 
against 
definitive 
sentences  
Possible  only in 
criminal trials 
after revision of 
Procedures of 
Civil Code 
156 appeals admitted in 
criminal law suits and 238 in 
civil law suits since January 
1st, 2003.1 
Intention to keep them in 
criminal cases despite 
international disapproval 
Appointment 
of CSM 
Screening by 
Parliament of 
proposals after 
restricted vote 
by judges 
Judges from higher Courts 
favored; screening by the 
Committees actually 
turned into selection; CSM 
rushed to endorse the 
position of the Ministry of 
Justice in recent scandals 
Unknown, draft law secret, 
constitutional provisions 
vague 
Independenc
e of the 
Supreme 
Court of 
Justice 
Judges six years 
tenure only 
Influence in CSM 
small 
President of the Court 
under strong attack by 
Minister of Justice, 
President of the state 
Judges to be granted full 
tenure after constitutional 
reform case by case when 
their tenure expires 
Enforcement 
of European 
Court of 
Human Rights 
decisions 
Current 
constitution 
admits 
international law 
overrides 
national one in 
human rights law 
Stalling of most ruling over 
property (the govt lost all 
of them) 
Infringement of the ruling 
limiting the right of the 
prosecutor to decide over 
preventive custody (the 
Pantea case) in the recent 
‘Ciucă’ scandal. 
Constitutional proposal 
limits application of 
international law if it is 
different than constitution, 
requiring its modification 
first; constitution can be 
modified only with 2/3rds 
majority and referendum 
                                                                          
1 Source: Apador- Romanian Helsinki Committee, quoting statistics obtained from 
Department of Justice on the basis of Freedom of Information Act. 
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 There is also risk of political appointments to the new Court of 
Cassation, as most of the current judges will lose tenure in the next two 
years. The political signals are ambiguous, as hastily conceived legal 
acts are passed overnight, more often than not through emergency 
ordinances, while actual practices that blatantly contradict them 
continue unabated.  
Fig. 1 makes clear the distance between proposed reforms and 
current practice, as the latter is the best indicator of the real political 
intentions. Where there is no will, there is no way, could well be its 
summary. Newspapers were flooded during the summer months by 
scandals engulfing these issues. While the official policy – for 
international consumption – is to abolish extraordinary appeals, the 
number accepted this year shows a strong political determination to 
keep them. The extraordinary appeal may be a powerful weapon in 
case a corruption trial goes wrong, a political opponent is set free or a 
client is sentenced. The General Prosecutor appeals very often, hurting 
the already low authority of the judiciary and sending the signal that a 
trial is over only when a politically convenient result is achieved. 
Judges from the Supreme Court who reversed original sentences after 
extraordinary appeals following political pressure and had meanwhile 
had their sentences invalidated by the European Courts of Human 
Rights should be reprimanded. Instead, they are promoted in the 
Department of Justice, CSM or awarded state medals2.  
Cabinet Reshuffle Leaves the Public Skeptical 
Its captive rural constituency aside, PSD declines steadily in urban 
areas, the real indicator of political change in Romania. Two 
independent surveys, SAR-CURS for this PWR, and the Barometer of 
Public Opinion (BOP, sponsored by Open Society Foundation) found a 
significant decline in urban areas compared to last fall, despite the 
success of NATO accession. As stated in previous issues of our reports, 
NATO accession does not alter much the trends of public opinion.  
Which means, however, that PSD still keeps its voters from the 2000 
elections. Its much higher figures when party preference is tested are 
due to severe underestimation of votes for small parties (3% in surveys 
compared to 12% in last elections) and extremely high rate of 
abstention (55.4%). In absolute figures, the government party has 
about the same slice as in 2000. But the erosion in urban areas is 
significant, and bound to continue. As we can see in Fig. 3, PSD is less 
likely to be supported by the young and the urban inhabitants, but 
also by people who are disillusioned with the direction the country is 
heading (who have reached 62.5% and growing). Those make over 
50% of the electorate, of which 15% still would vote for PSD 
(representing 38% of their constituency!). This group is likely to desert 
the government party to search for an alternative unless something 
radical is done to assure them the direction has changed.  
                                                                          
2 The case of judge Ivanov, reported by Adevarul, www.adevarulonline.ro   
Judicial reform: 
where there is 
no will, there is 
no way 
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By contrast, the large number of voters who would refrain from voting 
or declare themselves undecided (44%) does not carry great potential 
for a shift in party preference. The relative majority of them (38%) 
would in fact prefer to have only one political party: these are the 
disillusioned authoritarians. Were they to vote, they would likely vote for 
a radical populist alternative, so the fact that they do not plan to vote 
at all is not such bad news. Mobilizing the democrats within this group 
remains an issue, but they are not likely to be mobilized by any current 
alternative: they are demobilized precisely because they perceive the 
current offer of parties as unappealing.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Who would (not) vote for the government party 
Predictors of vote for 
PSD 
Regression 
coefficient B 
Standard error Significance 
Age under 35 -.555 .156 .000 
Education -- -- NS 
Larger than village -.690 .238 .000 
Direction wrong -.766 .139 .000 
Constant -.716 .276 .009 
Source: BOP Gallup 
The government proceeded in June 2003 to the reshuffle this report 
advocated a year ago. However, what SAR had argued for was a 
reshuffle based on the need to streamline the decision-making, 
increase policy coherence, to eliminate overlaps and redundancies of 
the central administration units. Evaluations of effectiveness of various 
compartments and ministers were available at the time of this 
exercise. However, very few, if any, seem to have been used. How can 
PSD is 
continuously 
losing young 
and urban 
voters
Fig. 2. Disillusioned urbanites
(urban voters only) 
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one even invoke policy coherence when THREE different offices have 
come under the last reshuffle under direct PM subordination, all with 
the same task of policy analysis and design? The first is what is left of 
the former Ministry of Information stripped of minorities and Roma 
departments; the second the National Commission or Prognosis, a 
leftover from the Minister of Prognosis and Development; and the third, 
the old Department for Institutional and Social Analysis, an almost 
informal unit working for the PM’s main (foreign) economic advisor. In 
practice none of them does what they are supposed to do, and as a 
result is still left to the ministries to design broad policies. No unit is 
empowered with the explicit task to coordinate among ministries or 
produce clear guidelines for policy. This complicated design reflects 
only the need to satisfy various power stakeholders. One would in vain 
search for a correlation between the ministers reshuffled and an 
evaluation of their performance, either personal or institutional. True, 
Dan Matei Agathon was dismissed; but subsequently this former 
Minister of Tourism and author of the unpopular project Dracula Park 
was promoted party spokesperson. The ministers of Health and 
Education were also changed: but the Ministers of Justice and 
Industry, with even more doubtful performances and ratings, stayed. In 
the end, tenure seems to correlate only with the strength of personal 
links to either President or Prime Minister. Little surprise, then, that both 
the media and the public perceived this reshuffling as barely a 
makeup for the Thessalonica European Council Summit.  
The government party missed therefore the reshuffle as an opportunity 
to persuade both the domestic and international public opinion that 
this move was meant to improve performance in view of the hard task 
to conclude negotiations for European accession by end 2004. 
However, nobody from the other parties seems to take advantage of 
this situation, as the Romanian opposition is weak and fragmented. The 
political spectrum remains therefore severely unbalanced. By the next 
2004-2005 elections Romania will have eleven out of fifteen years of 
transition dominated by the main postcommunist party, now called 
PSD, with the other four ruled by a broad coalition of anticommunists 
and postcommunists. This misbalance explains by itself some of 
Romania’s problems in tackling corruption and achieving government 
performance. As recent scholarly work proved3, performance of the 
state in East Central Europe is less influenced by size of the government 
and type of previous Communist regime, as by the pattern of political 
competition during transition. Romania’s pattern of one dominant 
party-political clique is the worst. The public perceives it: a sizable 
majority believes that seats in Parliament are bought, corruption went 
up after the last change of government. The MPs are rated as the most 
corrupt social group in Romania. The SAR-CURS public opinion survey 
also shows that the public is not convinced by the government anti-
corruption campaign, perceived as being partisan and ineffective by  
the majority of the Romanians (Fig. 5) 
                                                                          
3 Anna Gryzmala Busse, Yale University. Party Competitions and State Institutions in East 
Central Europe, paper presented at Strengthening States, Consolidating Democracies, 
Bluebird workshop, European University Institute, May 16-17, 2003 
Members of the 
Parliament are 
perceived as 
the most 
corrupt social 
group in 
Romania
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In fact, this campaign is ineffective because it is partisan: how can the 
public be convinced of the impartiality of the still young Anti-
Corruption Prosecutor’s Office when the only politicians investigated 
are former and current opposition leaders? In a move which can only 
destroy any credibility of this office, investigations were reopened on 
the old file ‘Privatization of the Commercial Fleet’, said to incriminate 
the main opposition leader, Bucharest’s Mayor Traian Băsescu, former 
minister of Transportation. The case was however investigated prior to 
1996, when the same party as today was in government. At the time 
both an ad-hoc parliamentary committee and the prosecutors 
decided there were no elements to prosecute Băsescu, who was the 
only Romanian politician to give up his immunity as a MP in order to 
stand investigation. Reopening this file without even the claim of new 
elements after eight years cannot but show that any anticorruption 
agency where the leadership is politically appointed cannot but fail 
miserably. As this report has warned a year ago, only a joint 
nomination by government and opposition of the anti-corruption 
prosecutor could eventually work in Romania.  
Fig. 4. Corruption since 2000...
0 10 20 30 40 50
Increased
Stayed the same
Decreased
DK
NA
Source: Gallup (BOP)
%
The Anti-
Corruption Chief 
Prosecutor 
should be 
appointed jointly 
by government 
and the 
opposition 
Fig. 5. Politicization of anti-corruption
The anti-corruption institutions target mostly...
na
13%
those who are 
in power
12%
everybody, they 
are impartial
31%
those who are 
not in power
44%
Source: CURS-SAR 
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The police has also provoked a scandal in July when it published its 
personal top of corruption, which candidly showed they arrest mostly 
professors and doctors, shielding their own as well as persons with 
political clout. The public opinion blames in fact policemen, judges 
and politicians in its own – quite different – top. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Workable Political Alternative Is Not Yet Born 
Despite the crushing defeat of the former coalition parties in the 2000 
elections, the years since were not used for any meaningful political 
construction. The Christian Democrats underwent a series of splits and 
mergers to end up in sheer obscurity. The Liberals (PNL) changed first 
their ancient President, Mircea Ionescu-Quintus, with Valeriu Stoica. 
Although Mr. Quintus was proven a collaborator of the former 
Securitate, parting with him was no soul-searching experience: indeed, 
most of the party seemed closer to him still than to the new leader. 
Stoica was the only one to push for a new political construction. It was 
precisely because of his plans to make again an alliance with the 
former coalition partners the Democrats (PD) that he lost power and 
only managed to secure some influence on the choice of his 
successor, Theodor Stolojan. Mr. Stolojan has tried since then to 
centralize the party and accommodate all factions, and recently 
brought up again the issue of an alliance with the Democrats. The 
latter had meanwhile suffered serious losses, as many of their local 
leaders and MPs have crossed the fence over to PSD. Few of the initial 
leaders the party has one been so proud of are now with Mayor Traian 
Băsescu, who replaced Petre Roman at the head of the party. These 
leaders were the largest group of technocrats in the Romanian politics 
Fig. 6. Subjective corruption top 
(Perceived as the most corrupt)
0 5 10 15 20
MPs
Doctors
Judges
Policemen
Businesspeople
Ministers
Mayors
Civil servants in local govt.
Local councilors
Journalists
Professors
Source: Gallup (BOP)
%
What went 
wrong with 
the previous 
centrist 
coalition? 
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and have embodied for many years the ideal of a new middle-aged 
generation in politics. Now scattered in inferior positions in both PSD 
and PD (some even crossed to the Liberals) they have ceased to 
matter at all.  
Is the pre-electoral alliance of PD and PNL the political construction 
Romania needs to balance its party system? Would this alliance profit 
the Romanian democracy and the partners? Finally, is it a feasible 
project? And if not, what alternative is there?  
Let us start with the last question. The Romanian political system could 
be balanced in two ways. First, by cutting the disproportioned power 
of one party, which used unscrupulously has meant in the last two 
years the recruitment of mayors elected under other parties colors, of 
public officials and businesspeople. This means further fragmentation, 
but fragmentation is at times preferable to having one dominant pole, 
especially in a country where state capture by networks of influence is 
the crucial issue. A Romania with 4-5 parties roughly the same size, 
forced into coalitions in order to form a government, would be better 
than a political landscape where one party dominates absolutely. This 
pattern is frequent in continental Europe. The path would have been 
open only if Mr. Guşă had had around him a wing of reformers from 
PSD willing to transform themselves into a more Third-Way party (as 
happened twice before with the split of Democrats and later of 
Teodor Meleşcanu). As long as Mr Guşă was just a lone reformer, or a 
man who simply lost in the power game, there was no chance to go 
down this road. 
The second path is by concentrating the forces of the democratic 
opposition into one coalition or party able to challenge PSD and win 
next elections. This is the path tried prior to 1996, and which produced 
the centrist coalition that governed between 1996 and 2000, made up 
of four main parties and a host of other smaller organizations. This 
center-right coalition produced three governments: Victor Ciorbea, 
Radu Vasile and Mugur Isărescu. Even if these governments had some 
successes in terms of structural economic reforms and 
decentralization, the overall coalition management, reflected in the 
government performance, was perceived as a failure. One serious 
problem burdening the design of a future coalition is the lack on any 
thorough analysis on the failure of the precedent one. Bad memories 
of these coalition governments were not completely erased by the 
increasing frustration with the PSD ‘barons’. Nor were the issues ever 
clearly addressed by the former coalition leaders, so that the public 
can see who is to blame for what for the shortcomings of the 1996-
2000 mandate. The current strategy, of putting all responsibility on the 
Christian Democrats, is unlikely to create a majority of supporters for 
Liberals and Democrats, even if the faults of Christian Democrats were 
real. The coalition as a whole still has to answer for the unsolved issues 
of the Contract with Romania, the failure to keep their leaders promise 
to boost foreign investment, the dragging of their feet in Parliament 
over many issues. There is a negative legacy pending on the credibility 
of all the former partners, and all have to come up with some 
Before initiating a 
new coalition, 
PNL and PD 
should try to 
understand why 
the previous one 
(CDR) failed 
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assurances that the problems were understood and addressed. 
Neither the Liberals, nor the Democrats, have a spotless record from 
the 1996-2000. A short list with the most obvious mistakes made while in 
power shows that responsibility must be divided between current 
opposition parties: 
• the indefinite stalling of property restitution legislation between 
1996-2000, left for the PSD next legislature (to be blamed: the 
Democrats) 
• the delay of privatization of state farms (to be blamed: the 
Democrats) 
• the ambiguous positions on the law on screening archives of former 
Securitate, leading to a poor law whose consequences are felt 
today in the blocking of CNSAS, the screening authority (to be 
blamed: Liberals, Christian Democrats) 
• the inability to pass in 2000 the ‘Justiţia’ legal package, crucial for 
Romania’s reform of the judiciary and EU accession (to be blamed: 
Democrats, Christian Democrats). Romania still struggles in 2003 to 
reinvent one by one (and pass through emergency ordinance) the 
elements of the so-called ‘Stoica’ package. 
• the inability to satisfy the basic requests of coalition agreements 
(eg. on Hungarian issues)  
• the low performance on EU accession; for example, the inability to 
satisfy requirements of Schengen visa lifting procedures, fuzzy 
reports on the issue (to be blamed: Christian Democrats) 
• the inability to agree on a  single candidate for presidential 
elections, allowing Vadim Tudor, the radical party leader, to enter 
the second round of presidential elections (to be blamed: all 
partners, including the Hungarian Alliance). 
This brief list shows that neither the principles, nor the implementation 
were truly satisfactory during the 1996-2000 mandate. It is true that 
Christian Democrats were governing for the first time, but this does not 
excuse the coalition as whole: Liberals and Democrats had been in 
government before. It is also true that during the governments of Radu 
Vasile and Mugur Isărescu the seeds of the present economic 
recovery were planted – but still, compared to the Slovak coalition 
which unseated Mr Meciar in 1997, the Romanian democratic parties 
performed very poorly. In 2000 they were not defeated, they were 
crushed, while the Slovaks managed to revamp their coalition, isolate 
Mr Meciar, and come up with a new reformist government. The 
performance on EU accession was far better in Slovakia compared to 
Romania during that time.  
Due to the intrinsic checks and balances of a multi-party government, 
corruption in Romania was however lower in 1996-2000 than it is today. 
This leaves a score of issues on which the former partners need to 
account for if they put together a new coalition. Relying on a protest 
The most serious 
mistakes made by 
CDR in 1996-2000 
were… 
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vote against PSD is not enough. The new would-be partnership has to 
persuade voters that previous cacophony and ferocious partitocratic 
tendencies (dividing public positions among coalition parties only, 
regardless of merit) are a thing of the past. But are they? As 
negotiations progress, the same ugly ghosts raise their heads again. In 
fact, it may well be that a new coalition proves even worse than the 
previous one. Two-party coalitions are always a problem, as they push 
towards permanent cleavages: in three or more partners, cleavages 
may shift from issue to issue.  
How to Design Coalitions that Work  
In neighboring Bulgaria, when anticommunist UFD lost elections due to 
coalition problems in the early nineties, it was reorganized effectively 
as single party (keeping the legal identity of parties) by Ivan Kostov, 
who later made it to premiership. This also allowed a better 
performance of UNFR and persuaded voters that they were capable 
of change. The arguments in favor of the three existing alternatives 
(pre-electoral alliance; post-electoral alliance; and tight coalition, 
Bulgarian way) are summarized in Fig. 7. We examine the usual five 
crucial issues of coalition-building: decision-making, support of the 
government in Parliament, policy cohesion once in government, 
potential votes and ideological identity. The underlying assumptions 
are that parties which engage in negotiations seek to gain more votes 
and offices, win elections, form a government which has support in 
Parliament and a unitary policy, while preserving their identity. In 
practice, some trade-offs are unavoidable between party ideology 
and program, and the overall coalition program. Participants in 
coalitions must accept some blurring of identities in order to build a 
government with a coherent set of policies.  
Fig. 7. Three types of coalition 
 Decision-making after 
office gaining 
Parliamentary 
support 
Policy 
cohesion 
Votes Ideology 
Pre-electoral 
alliance 
0 0 0 0 0 
Post-electoral 
alliance 
– – – – – 
Unifying 
coalition 
+ + + + 0 
Legend: + gains compared to present situation; - losses; 0- no change. 
A post-electoral alliance of opposition parties would represent no gain. 
Voters would still perceive parties as unable to unite and pursuing their 
sole interest, programs would not be harmonized, leaving, even in the 
distant prospect of winning elections, each party with separate ideas 
and decision making fora. The exercise of harmonization would be 
postponed until after elections, as it happened in 1996. Needless to 
say, that experience was a disaster. 
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The pre-electoral alliance with common lists as currently negotiated 
would have some advantages. Liberals and Democrats would not 
compete unnecessarily, getting a chance to unseat Greater Romania 
Party from its second position. The two parties are unlikely to gain more 
votes than they have separately, though, as their current identity 
would be fully preserved, and its popularity is limited. Except some 
coordination and in-fighting for seats on the common lists it is unlikely 
that a common decision-making and a coherent program would 
emerge. Some coordination is better than lack of it, but examining the 
gains of a pre-electoral coalition one cannot fail to notice that its 
advantages are slim.  
The only move with potential to make a difference would be the 
creation of a new entity, Bulgarian model, organized as one political 
party, with a unique chain of command at both the national and local 
level, a unique planning unit and policy design compartment, which 
would go behind the narrow ideology which voters do not care about 
anyway, to embrace a larger, Third Way-type platform. In various 
expressions, voters report in the polls that poverty is the main problem 
of Romania. When 80% of the voters are chiefly concerned with 
poverty, and less than 30% have a clear ideological identity (be it 
center-right or left) insisting on a pure ‘liberal’ ideology makes little 
sense.  It would mean to confine PNL below 20% of the total pool of 
votes.  
As this hypothetical exercise discusses mainly the Liberals and the 
Democrats (though other smaller parties may be involved in such a 
reorganization) it is also useful to check their assumed ideological 
distance (Fig. 8). Taking into account two items, attitude towards state 
intervention in economy (proxy: the creation of jobs in the public 
sector as main strategy against unemployment) and the attitude 
towards competition, we compared current voters of Democrats and 
Liberals. If ideology would be a scale of one to ten, the ideological 
distance between the voters of the two parties would be around 0.7-
0.9%, i.e. less than one unit on the scale of ten. The voters the two 
parties risk alienating are therefore below ten percent for them 
together.  
The secret of building successful coalitions is said to reside in the 
fulfillment of the self-interest of partners. Parties do not make coalitions 
out of their concern for the public, but out of their own interest to 
maximize their gains. Although this axiom relies on two disputable 
assumptions – that parties behave as unique actors; and that 
mechanisms are automatically created to help identify their best 
interest even in relatively new and unconsolidated parties – let us 
examine what parties would stand to gain or lose out of the two more 
plausible exercises, pre-electoral alliance or tight coalition. 
 
 
If they are to stand 
a chance in the 
2004 elections 
PNL and PD should 
form a tight Union 
with only one 
leadership, policy 
unit, program and 
electoral lists 
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Fig. 8. Ideological distance between the voters of PNL and PD 
 PNL PD 
The state should create jobs in the public sector 
to cure unemployment, % 
 29.8 37.9 
Competition is beneficial  for the economy, %    86.8 76.0 
   Source: BOP Gallup 
Fig. 9. Expected utilities for PNL and PD 
 PNL 
Votes Offices Internal cohesion Electoral alliance 
(0,0) (-,-) (0,0) PD 
Tight coalition (union) (+,+) (+,+) (-,-) 
 
Both parties risk having internal dissent in the event of a tight coalition 
(union). Reorganization means that at the local level one person only is 
in charge of overall coordination. It does not mean, however, that 
party jobs are cut by half, as the parties would be reorganized in a 
new formula. Both reorganization and pre-electoral alliance imply 
common lists. In the event of a pre-electoral alliance the pool of votes 
may not grow more than the votes for the two parties taken 
separately4 (though they would probably score better by benefiting of 
the maximum utility voting, as the main opposition parties). In the 
event of a tight coalition presented to the voters as a new product the 
pool of potential votes would grow: both BOP Gallup and our survey 
show the potential of a unique opposition party is large. This means 
that both parties would stand to gain out of the union. As both have 
been centralized in the past year, the political will of the two leaders 
would suffice to realize the move. Potential splinters would not be 
followed by more than ten percent of the constituencies. Most likely, 
they would not be followed by anybody, because voters are likely to 
migrate towards the party ideologically closest rather than endorse 
splinters. For the Democrats the loss of party activists may be more 
dramatic than the loss of voters; but as the union would be 
reorganized the party activists who would desert for PSD are not really 
the reliable people needed to build an alternative.  
But eventually the most important argument in favor of a union is that 
chances of a pre-electoral coalition to gain enough votes to win 
office are low. If this solution is preferred, gains will be small to non-
significant, and the constant bickering issue by issue (should parties ally 
or compete for this or that office) may even deteriorate relations by 
the time of general elections. On the contrary, the design of a unique 
body where decisions are made, a policy unit and an arbitration body 
would anchor such issues in objective grounds. Decisions would then 
be based on research of potential of each candidate, leaving the 
                                                                          
4 According to an Insomar July 2003  poll. 
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door open to new recruits with good public profile which would help 
the coalition increase its number of votes. The public wants an 
opposition in the form of one party (59%, CURS July 2003), with only 30% 
agreeing to the formula of several parties alternating to government. 
The main argument against union comes from the European affiliation 
of these two parties. Liberals are affiliated with the Liberal International, 
Democrats with the Socialist International, where their presence 
hinders the full legitimizing of PSD in the international arena. A fusion of 
the two parties would be popular with the international community, 
but as the Liberals are unlikely to accept to move to the Socialist 
International it could create difficulties for the Democrats. A union in 
which the two parties would be reorganized as one, while keeping 
their legal identities separate would not create these problems. Legally 
the new entity would be just a coalition: the Kostov model shows 
however that the only coalitions effective are those organized as one 
party. In short, even assuming that the international affiliations of 
parties would have produced important gains in the past decade – in 
fact they have not – this is just an imagined obstacle to the creation of 
a union.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To the Romanian government 
1. The scandal concerning Ms. Puwak, the Minister of EU Integration, is 
de facto covered by article 72.1 of the current law161/2003 (Title 
IV, Section 2) if the article is interpreted correctly. But as European 
funds (and other funds from donors) are not specifically assimilated 
to Romanian public funds and a minister may not be hold 
responsible for a tender with the involvement of her department, 
but without her personal presence, a clearer legal provision is 
needed here. 
Amend conflict of interest legislation with a clear article regulating 
public expenditure with a specific mentioning of EU funds. One 
single article would be enough, stating that no person working in 
any capacity for an authority involved in allocating or managing 
public is allowed to gain material profit for itself or family members 
out of the tenders organized by the authority. The current 
anticorruption package, lengthy as it is, has some good provisions, 
but also many loopholes.  
Address the public concern over partisanship of the anticorruption 
campaign. Investigate the mayor of Bucharest for current 
wrongdoings (if any), but do not open files already closed. Charge 
at least now and then members of the government party, or at 
least expel them from the party when proved corrupt. Recent 
allegations against Hildegarde Puwak or Miron Mitrea should not 
be dismissed without investigations. 
2. The reform of the judiciary should be urgently brought on the right 
track. While reform of the civil service, at least formally, recorded 
A union would not 
affect PNL and PD’s 
membership to the 
Liberal and 
Socialist 
International 
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some progress, reform of the judiciary is trailing miserably behind. 
The laws promulgated as emergency ordinances – codes of 
procedure for civil and criminal courts, for instance – were all part 
of the 2000 package presented by the former Minister of Justice 
Valeriu Stoica to the Parliament at that moment. The package was 
drafted with international assistance and even admitting the 
current government wants to operate important changes there is 
no reason why three years later the drafts are produced one by 
one, and many pieces are still missing. There is no excuse for the 
delay and the lack of transparency of the process. Also, it is about 
time the extraordinary appeal and its underlying assumption, that 
Courts are often wrong but the government is always right, was 
given up entirely. 
Empower the judiciary through the adoption of a CSM law 
liberalizing the election of its members (by giving more say to 
judges from lower echelons), an enhanced role to the Supreme 
Court, and reducing the capacity of the Parliament to revert the 
selection. The spirit of the Constitutional amendments is for better 
separation of powers; make this effective by ending the 
subordination of the judiciary. Abolish the extraordinary appeals 
and instead introduce professional evaluations of judges by the 
new CSM, which would make those pronouncing ‘wrong’ rulings 
pay a career cost. Give up the political reversals of rulings, or else 
the Romanian judiciary will never have real authority. Dismiss the 
personnel involved in the process of reform if deadlines are not 
met.    
To opposition parties 
When planning to create a new coalition, address the public concern 
that this may function as badly as the last one. If you find the political 
will to do it, go for the union, not the loose alliance. Coming before the 
public with a new construction is the only way to distance from the 
past coalition and its shortcomings. This will not secure electoral victory 
by itself, of course, but anything less will not work for certain. The 
challenger of PSD will have this time to show not only a clear program, 
but also new people, not tainted by scandals, The sooner the union 
presents a shadow cabinet working the more the public will be 
convinced this time it might work. 
Decoupling presidential and parliamentary elections is a bad idea. This 
implies Romania would have a full electoral year (local in mid 2004, 
presidential in the fall, legislative in spring 2005). The uncertainty and 
campaigning should be reduced to a minimum not to impede 
Romania’s EU accession. The disproportion among presidential 
candidates is at this time smaller than the disproportion among parties, 
so disjoining the legislative and presidential elections could only 
benefit PSD. Opposition parties should resist suggestions from the 
President and/or government to disjoin presidential and parliamentary 
elections. By January 2005 Romania needs a new government to 
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embark on the difficult task of implementing the commitments 
undertaken during negotiations. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Voting intentions after the 2000 elections (CURS)
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FOCUS 
 
 
2. ECONOMY 
MID-2003 MACROECONOMIC HIGHLIGHTS 
 
Romania’s target date of admission in the European Union is 2007. At 
the last summit, in Thessalonica, the EU leaders restated their 
encouragement for and support to Romania so that it joins the Union 
by 2007. Likewise, they nudged the Romanian government to pursue 
unrelentessly required reforms with regard to industrial restructuring, 
public administration and the judiciary system.  
This analysis aims at presenting a succinct overview of economic 
developments in Romania and likely immediate prospects at the end 
of the first half of 2003. In order to make this brief assessment it pays to 
consider some premises which are rooted in the economy’s dynamics. 
Macroeconomic Premises 
Economic recovery has continued after years of massive decline of 
overall production and a drastic balance of payments adjustment in 
the late 90s. The rise in the GDP has been quite rapid in the last couple 
of years, which matches an evolution one encounters in other 
accession countries as well. The increase of the GDP in the first quarter 
of 2003 was estimated by the National Institute of Statistics at 4.4%, 
albeit a question mark arises in this respect in view of the slowed down 
pace of industrial production and services during that quarter (these 
sectors have grown by 2.5 and, respectively, 3.6% in the same period). 
Disinflation has been well underway (Fig. 1) and the economy is 
moving toward the single digit frontier, which would mark a major 
achievement as against the past decade. Arguably, the USD 
depreciation (vis-à-vis Euro) in 2002 played a significant role in 
mitigating inflationary expectations and a quasi-exchange rate based 
stabilization program operated last year 
Romania has been running relatively small current account deficits in 
recent years – below 4% in 2002 (Fig. 2); these deficits have bolstered 
the country’s credentials to get improve ratings and access more 
cheaply foreign capital markets. As a matter of fact, Romania 
received better ratings from the main agencies in 2002 (BB-), but is still 
several notches below an investment grade. Budget deficits of around 
3% were registered in the last few years, which meet the benchmark 
set by the Maastricht criteria for EU accession; in 2002 the budget 
deficit was –2.67%. The economy has a low external indebtedness, of 
P O L I C Y  W A R N I N G  R E P O R T  −  A U G  2 0 0 3  
 
 
 
cca 30% of GDP (Fig. 3) and a small part of it is short-term; this fact 
helps to access foreign capital markets. 
There has been a large expansion of trade in recent years, but low 
value added products continue to hold a major share. Likewise, 
domestic credit has grown quite rapidly in the same period of time, 
which supported the growth of the non-governmental sector, of the 
economy in general. Capital account liberalization is programmed to 
be completed, in the main, by 2004. Two restrictions are, however, put 
in place; one regards transactions in the Romanian money markets by 
non-residents and purchases of land by non residents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Inflation Rate (CPI)
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Fig. 3. Macroeconomic indicators 
Source: National statistics and own estimates; *forecast            
The macroeconomic premises underlined above need to be judged 
against the background of a series of structural features of the 
Romanian economy which condition its future dynamics:  
• whereas the private sector accounts for more than  66% of GDP, 
financial indiscipline continues to be quite high –arrears afflict the 
energy sector in particular (the losses in this sector amounted to 
cca 2% of GDP in 2002, according to some estimates);. 
• there is an ongoing crisis of social security, which is due primarily to 
the stark imbalance between active and retired population and its 
aging;  
• while the banking sector is much cleaner currently (as evidenced 
by the small share of non-performing loans) than in the late 90s, 
there is heavy dolarization of the economy (60% of deposits are 
hard currency denominated) 
• monetization is low (M2 is only 25% of GDP), which exposes the 
economy to the impact of large swings of capital flows and implies 
high costs of sterilization for the Central Bank; the low monetization 
reveals some pitfalls of a two fast liberalization of the capital 
account; 
• the low current account deficits of recent years have been 
enhanced by rising remittances from abroad (over 1.5 billion USD in 
2002) --Romania has become a significant exporter of both skilled 
and unskilled labor. 
Macroeconomic Policies in 2002 and 2003 
In order to continue disinflation simultaneously with economic growth 
macroeconomic policy has relied on a special complexion of its mix. 
The main traits of this policy mix have been: (a)  keeping the budget 
deficits low and relaxing the tight monetary policy, so that the latter 
supports economic recovery (Fig. 4); (b) a real exchange rate 
 2000 2001 2002 2003* 2004* 
Real GDP, % change 2.1 5.7 4.9 4.5(?) 4.5(?) 
Inflation (CPI) 40.7 30.3 17.8 13(?) 10(?) 
Budget deficit -3.5 -3.3 -2.7 -2.7 -3.5 
Current account deficit -5.7 -5.6 -3.6 -4.5(?) -5 
Official reserves (bn USD)  4.8 7.1 7(?)  
Total ext. debt…         % GDP,  31 35 32 34 
                                     % of exports  81 85 85  
Interest payments, % of exports  4.1 3.8   
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appreciation as against a currency basket, in order to help disinflation; 
and (c) declining lending interest rates in ROL (the domestic currency) 
in order to enhance domestic credit, at a time when hard currency 
denominated credit grew, arguably in excess.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are several domestic and international developments which 
have provided the context of implementation and conditioned the 
efficacy of the policy mentioned above:  
• a sharp appreciation of the Euro vs. the USD which has 
complicated the exchange rate policy and, probably, imparted 
Fig. 4. The trend in the interest rate
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an inflationary bias to this ( the still high inflation rate in Romania 
and an exchange rate appreciation policy as against a currency 
basket makes it such that, when the Euro appreciates too sharply 
against the USD the implied ROL’s  depreciation against the single 
currency creates some inflationary pressure); 
• the ongoing recession in the European Union, which cuts from the 
stimulus to Romanian exports (which have been driving economic 
recovery in 2001 and 2002); 
• the great uncertainty in the world economy and the high risk 
aversion of investors, which makes them highly discriminatory 
among emerging markets; consequently. there has been more 
reliance on domestic demand for growth in 2003 (than in 2002);  
• a growing current account deficit in 2003, which is not surprising in 
view of the economic recovery and bigger imports related to 
domestic investment;  
• considerable arrears in a period of disinflation, which perpetuate 
substantial quasi-fiscal deficits and  may imperil future public 
budgets;  
• a nervous domestic foreign exchange market due to capital 
outflows, and, probably, less capital inflows (errors and omissions 
turned negative in 2002, to –776 million USD, and reached 654 
million USD in the first quarter of 2003) 
The goals of macroeconomic policy in conjunction with the 
developments highlighted above create a set of policy challenges for 
the second half of this year and 2004. 
Challenges and Risks for Macroeconomic Policy in 
2003 
What can slow down economic growth? 
The rise in the GDP was estimated at about 4.4% in the first quarter of 
this year by the Institute of national Statistics. More than this number in 
itself (which includes household and underground output, with these 
components evincing the most rapid expansion) the figures 
concerning industrial production and services – which, together, 
account for over 75% of GDP, give some pause for thought. It the 
dynamic of these sectors does not speed up, on average, in the other 
three quarters the official GDP target for 2003 would be hard to attain. 
In addition, the very likely poor agricultural output would make this 
outcome more probable. The bottom line is: the dynamic of the GDP 
needs to be examined in the context of the overall macroeconomic 
performance; what matters for Romania, essentially, is to have 
sustainable growth together with disinflation and easily financed 
current account deficits. 
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What can cause an inflationary slippage? 
A possible cause of an inflationary slippage could be a continuing 
sharp appreciation of the euro (against the USD) in keeping with the 
exchange rate policy practiced by the NBR in the last couple of years. 
Some argue that this appreciation is not threatening since the USD 
would, still, shape inflationary expectations in Romania and a large 
portion of imports is dollar denominated. I find this argument 
insufficiently convincing for several reasons: already, many 
transactions and prices are related to the euro once the single 
currency became, officially, the reference currency on last March 1st; 
moreover, basic excises (especially for gasoline) are calculated in the 
euro, whose nominal and real appreciation vis-à-vis the ROL has been 
quite high in the first five months of this year. In the first five months of 
this year the ROL depreciated vs. the Euro by cca 8% in nominal terms 
and by more than 2% in real terms. At the same time the ROL 
appreciated both nominally and really vs. The USD. This is why it makes 
sense to think about how a possible negative influence can be 
counteracted?  
There are two basic scenarios in this respect. One scenario bets on a 
USD recovery, which would provide an enormous bonus to disinflation 
in Romania by reproducing the circumstances of last year. In addition, 
a decline of the euro would relieve the pressure of the rise in various 
excises. But this scenario, although with a reasonable likelihood to 
occur in view of the growth differentials between the USA and the 
Euroland, is not a policy contingency plan per se.  
The other scenario regards a further appreciation of the euro during 
2003, however implausible it may seem to some. But policy making has 
to consider such a situation. Should it happen and should the Central 
Bank not resort to an excessive appreciation of the ROL (as a means to 
combat the inflationary pressure), a tighter monetary policy may have 
to be implemented. But a tightening of monetary policy would raise, or 
slow the decline of the cost of borrowing, which would impact growth 
negatively. On the other hand, higher interest rates would relieve the 
strain in the forex market (a negative effect would be, however, a 
further stimulus to demand for hard currency denominated borrowing). 
Consequently, the National bank of Romania would have to calibrate 
very cautiously its instruments so that it balances the simultaneous 
goals of sustained growth and disinflation; a good calibration would 
avert a too visible trade-off. 
How appropriate is the level of interest rates?  
The second half of 2002 and the first five months of this year have 
witnessed a rapid decline of interest rates. Aside from the need to 
bolster economic growth the decline of lending rates for ROL-
denominated credits was seen as a tool to mitigate the risks of 
excessive hard currency denominated borrowing. But passive interest 
rates declined, arguably, too rapidly and this has showed up in a drop 
of ROL denominated deposits in the second quarter of this year (which 
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may reflect. Moreover, the fall in domestic interest rates may have 
increased the propensity of some capital to flow out of the country, 
against the backdrop of capital account liberalization. The lesson is: 
there is need for caution with the speed of lowering interest rates so 
that bank deposits (n ROL) be not harmed and the balance of 
payments not strained exceedingly.   
Has the expansion of hard currency denominated domestic credit 
been too rapid?  
While the expansion of domestic credit (by more than 25% in real terms 
in 2002) was widely hailed early on some alarm was expressed by NBR 
officials lately with regard to the rapid increase of hard currency 
denominated lending. The concerns revolve around exchange rate 
risk in view of the wild gyrations on currency markets and the lack of 
routine of Romanian companies to use hedging for forex risk 
protection. Some commercial bankers have contended that the NBR’s 
stance in this regard is overcautious since –they assert – most lending is 
done out of deposits made by residents. However, they seem to 
overlook that the distinction between domestic credit based on 
foreign borrowing vs. that based on deposits made by residents is 
fundamentally dented when the capital account is liberalized – which 
is the case with current program of KAL in Romania.  
Is the rise in imports worrying? 
The first five months of 2003 showed a significant rise in imports, which 
have grown to over 8.7 billion USD, while the trade deficit went 
beyond 2 billion USD. If this trend continues the current account deficit 
may approach 5% this year. This level of the deficit should not be of 
concern were the biggest portion of additional imports made up of 
capital goods and their financing were done easily. What surprises, 
however, is that imports have increased so much while the pace of 
growth of industrial output and services (which make up most of the 
GDP) was not impressive in the first quarter of this year. It may be that 
this pace accelerated in the second quarter. 
Do arrears pose an increasing threat?                                       
Financial indiscipline continues to plague the Romanian economy and 
it shows up in substantial arrears. For instance, the losses in the energy 
sector amounted to about 2% of GDP in 2002 (according to some 
estimates). Arrears do create quasi-fiscal deficits, which may imperil 
future public budgets unless addressed in due time. Data for this year 
are quite scarce, so that an adequate judgment is hard to make in this 
regard. It is clear, nonetheless, that disinflation strains the balance 
sheet of inefficient companies, for the latter (and not only) used 
inflation as a weapon to cut their liabilities in real terms. The evolution 
of arrears needs to be watched carefully by policy-makers. 
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Risks in 2004 
There is a series of areas of possible concern in 2004, which demand 
policy makers’ attention.  Prominent among these is the danger of 
excessive populist macroeconomics in an election year. Populism may 
take also the form of imprudent wage policy (unjustified pay rises in 
the public sector); dangerously declining interest rates, which may fuel 
again inflation; leniency towards tax offenders, which may worsen 
financial indiscipline, etc.  
The Ministry of Finance has aired the idea of a larger budget deficit in 
2004 (of cca. 3.5%), in order to finance additional infrastructure 
projects. Can Romania afford a higher budget deficit? The IMF would 
likely oppose such a move in view of the disinflation effort and the 
need to reduce crowding in the economy. The Maastricht criteria 
would also point against such a rise. However, there may be leeway 
for the Government to increase the budget deficit assuming that: 
financial discipline improves in the economy and quasi-fiscal deficits 
go down; most of the rise in the budget deficit is financed externally 
and, thereby, crowding out is limited; and last, but not least, the rise in 
the budget deficit is used exclusively for the purpose of infrastructure 
work. All this said, the Government would have to realize that 
increasing the budget deficit, unless it is accompanied by a 
remarkably disciplined policy making, poses significant risks –especially 
in an election year. And major slippage, of any sort, would undermine 
credibility, in a critical period for improving Romania’s credentials to 
join the EU and bring her rating nearer to an investment grade. 
Another area of concern is the fragility of the non-bank financial 
sector, which asks for resolute action and a strengthening of 
supervision activity. Should capital outflows go on at an excessive 
pace a reassessment of the current program of capital account 
liberalization would be needed. 
As a matter of principle, policy makers should have at the very top of 
their agenda Romania’s not losing contact with other EU accession 
countries in terms of economic performance. 2004 is the year of EU 
entry for seven Central European countries and Romania needs to do 
much better economically so that 2007 become a realistic admission 
date. 
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3. SOCIETY 
A demographic time bomb? 
 
The National Institute of Statistics started to release the final results of 
the 2002 population census. According to these data, Romania has 
lost over 1 million inhabitants, or 4.2% of the population, since the 
previous census, in 1992. Moreover, extrapolating these trends, the 
Institute forecasts that by 2020 the Romanian population will decrease 
by a further 1.8 million. The data has unleashed a wave of public angst 
and self-doubt over the fate of the country. The question this paper 
poses is how worrisome the data really are, and what if anything could 
be done about them. Demographic trends are hardly susceptible to 
government intervention, as they reflect deep social and cultural 
transformations. We believe therefore that it is advisable to shift 
government policy so as to take into account these trends, especially 
by introducing incentives in the social insurance system to encourage 
people to contribute for longer and to rely less on public social security 
mechanisms. The forthcoming EU integration will make the challenges 
more acute, as it will open the perspective of increased mobility of 
younger and better educated people, and will force us to eventually 
address the underdevelopment of rural areas.  
CONCERNS 
Beyond the uncomfortable feeling of being a sort of endangered 
species, the Romanian public’s concern over the decline of the 
population is related mainly to the ageing of population, and to its 
consequences over the sustainability of the social insurance system 
(the pension system first of all). In addition, many analysts perceive the 
high, and growing share of rural population as a drain on the 
economic development and a vulnerable spot in the EU enlargement 
process. Not least, the life expectancy, and mortality statistics show 
Romanians trailing behind our CEE neighbors, let alone the EU partners.  
Population decline 
The drastic population decline has two sources. On one hand, there is 
the migration out-flow. It peaked early in the last decade, after the 
1989 regime change, and has stabilized at a low level lately. The 
largest population fall however comes from the negative natural 
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growth. The birth and fertility rates have dived after 1989. In contrast, 
(male) mortality rate has surged, possibly in connection with the stress 
of transition. Life expectancy at birth declined over the 1990s, but the 
bottom has been reached in 1996, and it has bounced back a little 
since. The differential between gender life expectancies remained 
wide, suggesting that men have been more affected than women.  
Some key indicators are presented in Fig. 1. Romanian population is 
now back at the 1980 level. The population has peaked in 1990, and 
has started to drop due to the strong emigration. The natural growth 
has stayed positive till 1991, but has turned negative afterwards. As the 
flow of emigration has stalled in the second half of the 1990s, negative 
natural growth has replaced it as the main cause of the population 
drop. Natural growth has also two components – birth rate, and 
mortality rate. The birth rate has steadily decreased since 1989. The 
death rate has increased after 1989 (mostly due to a substantial drop 
in male life expectancy), but reached the bottom in 1995 and 
bounced back afterwards.  
Fig. 1. Population dynamics 
 1981 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001
Total  
population (Mil) 
22..35 22.72 23.51 23.20 23.18 22.79 22.73 22.61 22.50 22.43 22.39 
Birth rate (per 
‘000) 
17.0 15.9 15.8 13.6 11.9 11.5 10.9 10.2 10.5 10.5 9.8 
Mortality rate  
(per ‘000) 
10.0 10.9 10.6 10.7 10.9 11.7 11.7 12.7 12.0 11.4 11.6 
Life expectancy 
at birth – average 
69.60 69.70 69.76 69.78 69.52 69.48 69.05 69.24 69.4 70.6 71.3 
Male 66.83 66.81 66.59 66.56 66.06 65.88 65.30 65.46 65.5 67 67.7 
Female 72.40 72.65 73.05 73.17 73.17 73.32 73.09 73.32 73.3 74.2 74.8 
Source: INSSE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Population dynamics by age groups
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Ageing  
Data also support the claim that Romanian population is ageing. The 
share of population over 60 years old has surpassed the proportion of 
those below 15 in 2000 – the latter have dropped in a decade from 
almost a quarter of the population, to less than 18% (Fig. 2 ). The 
smaller cohorts born after 1989 enter fertility age. Coupled with 
continue low birth rate, and improving life expectancy, this might result 
in the ageing of the population gathering speed.  
Rural population 
The share of the population leaving in the rural areas has marked a 
surprising increase (Fig. 3). Romania has the largest share of rural 
population among CEE countries, way over the EU average of less 
than 20%. Fig. 4 presents these comparative data for 2001 – Romania 
has the lowest urban population, thus corresponding to the highest 
urban one. These comparative statistic have however to be read with 
a grain of salt, because the definition of urban and rural municipalities 
varies from a country to another. In Romania, there is tendency to 
promote the ‘town’ status small, former rural municipalities, those 
artificially enhancing the urban share of the population.  
Fig. 3. Urban/rural dynamic between censuses 
2002 1992  
 %  % 
1992-2002, % 
change 
TOTAL 21,698,181 100.0 22,810,035 100.0 95.8 
URBAN 11,436,736 52.7 12,391,819 54.3 92.3 
RURAL 10,261,445 47.3 10,418,216 45.7 98.5 
Source: INSSE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Share of urban population in CEE, 2001
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A few months after the population census, the Romanian Institute of 
Statistics has also conducted an agricultural census, which will be used 
in determining the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) support to 
Romania after accession to EU. The agricultural census, using a 
different methodology, found that only 28.3% of the active population 
is actually employed in agriculture. Still daunting, the later is a much 
smaller figure. The Prime Minister was unhappy with the conduct of the 
agricultural census, and publicly rebuked the president of the National 
Statistic Institute, who consequently resigned. The controversy over this 
sharp revision of official statistics is thus likely to continue. 
Habitation  
There are also pieces of good news in the data. This is the case with 
the habitation situation, where the reduction in population, coupled 
with increased built area has resulted in a marked upswing in the 
leaving area per person (see Fig. 5). Moreover, the increased number 
of households, and the lower number of people leaving in a household 
suggests younger people have been able to leave parental homes 
earlier than previous generations.  
Fig. 5. Improving habitation conditions 
 2002 1992 2002 in % against 
1992 
Number of households  7,392,131 7,288,676 101.4 
Mean number of persons per household 2.89 3.07 94.1 
Number of buildings 4,846,572 4,491,565 107.9 
Number of dwellings 8,110,407 7,659,003 105.9 
Number of habitation rooms 20,702,994 18,847,496 109.8 
Surface of habitation area – ‘000, sqm 304,253 258,518 117.7 
Mean habitation area per dwelling – sqm 37.5 33.8 110.9 
Habitation area per person – sqm 14.2 11.5 123.5 
Source: INSSE 
 
Fig. 6. Breakdown by population age groups in EU candidate countries 
% of population 
age groups out of 
total, 2001 
Bg Cy Cz Est Hu Lv Lit Pol Ro Slov Sk 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
–14 14.6 21.5 15.9 17.2 16.3 16.6 19.0 18.2 17.4 15.4 18.6 
15–24 13.9 15.5 14.6 14.9 14.1 14.8 14.6 16.9 15.8 14.2 16.8 
25– 59 49.0 46.9 50.9 46.3 49.0 46.7 46.9 48.1 47.8 50.7 48.9 
60+ 22.5 16.1 18.6 21.6 20.6 21.9 19.5 16.8 19.0 19.7 15.7 
Source: INSSE 
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Data Assessment 
The demographic trends are worrying, but they have to be put into 
perspective. If we compare other CEE countries, Romanian population 
is neither older, nor registering a larger decline. Neither is our 
demographic dependency rate worse than that of our neighbors. For 
exemplification see Fig. 6 below. Both in what concerns the share of 
the younger than 14, and of the over 60 year old Romania is not an 
outlayer.   
The population decline per se is not necessarily a disaster. The view of 
a growing population as a source of national strength is rather 
unfashionable today. Its connection to national prosperity (in per 
capita terms) is not straightforward. What is really troubling in Romania 
is the very high dependency rate measured as the number of 
beneficiaries of social security per number of contributors. From the 
over 10 million active population, only 4 million Romanians are legally 
employed, and therefore pay for social insurance. Fig. 7 shows the 
evolution of this crucial indicator after 1990. Starting with a healthy 
situation where employees outnumbered the pensioners more than 
three times, by 2000 the two groups were even, and the downward 
trend continued ever since. Two factors were in play here. On one 
hand, the number of employees declined, as the unemployment 
surged, and especially as many people took refuge in the black 
economy, or used part time contracts (convenţii civile) to bypass 
paying full social contributions. Equally important however was the 
huge rise in early retirement (many times an alternative to 
unemployment), and retirement for medical reasons (many times 
fraudulent). This situation has little to do with demographic dynamics, 
and more with the general economic climate, incentive structure, and 
law enforcement.  
The population decline is based mainly on the lower fertility rate. This is 
the trend however least likely to alter, as it reflects deeper social 
changes. Many analysts have connected the decline in fertility with 
the economic and social trials of transition. An improvement in the 
economic outlook will probably increase the willingness of people to 
raise children. But similar decreases in the fertility rate have been 
registered in CEE countries which have recovered better from 
transition, and also in the affluent Western European societies.  Figure  
8 shows that, among CEE countries, Romania actually has the highest 
birth rate.  
The statistical data also show that people postpone (the first) 
marriage, and have children later. 2000, with 135,800 marriages, had 
the lowest crude marriage rate (6.1 per ‘000) of the postwar period. 
Life style factors are probably an equally important factor in these 
choices as is the economic situation. Evidence for this is the finding 
that only 5% of children are born by women who graduated higher or 
secondary education. Taking into account that Romanians record the 
widely met correlation between education attainment and income, 
this data suggests there is a negative correlation between income and 
the number of children.  
The population 
decline per se is 
not necessarily a 
disaster 
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After 2005, the active population (both economically and from the 
fertility point of view) will start to include the lower cohorts of post-1989. 
Combined with the low fertility, this lower intake will result in both fewer 
births, and a higher demographic dependency rate (i.e. dependents 
per active population). Where an improved economy will clearly be 
beneficial, is in its impact on life expectancy. Romania trails badly in 
this respect, both compared to EU countries, and even to its CEE 
neighbors (see Fig. 9). The 1990s have been extremely tough on 
Romanian males, who registered a decline in life expectancy. The 
trend is now positive. A stable and improving economic situation will 
allow life expectancy (both due to psychological factors, and to 
increased spending on healthcare) to start gaining ground. Welcome 
as this development will be, it will contribute to the ageing of the 
population, thus worsening further the demographic dependency 
rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Live births and natural increase across CEE – 2001 data 
 Bg Cy Cz Est Hu Lv Lit Pol Ro Slov Sk 
Live births on 1000 
habitants 
8.5 11.6 8.9 9.3 9.5 8.3 9.1 9.5 9.8 8.8 9.5 
Natural increase 
on 1000 habitants 
-5.8 4.8 -1.7  -4.3  -3.4  -5.7  -2.5 0.1 -1.8  -0.5  -0.2 
Source: INSSE 
Fig. 9. Life expectancy across CEE – 2001 data 
 Bg Cy Cz Est Hu Lv Lit Pol Ro Slov Sk 
Life expectancy 
(on birth – years) 
M 68.6 76.1 72.14 64.73 68.15 65.2 65.9 70.2 67.69 72.1 69.54 
  F 75.3 81.0 78.45 76.22 76.46 76.6 77.4 78.4 74.84 79.6 77.60 
Life expectancy 
(at the age of 65 - 
years) 
M 13.0 16.5 14.00 12.6 13.04 12.5 13.3 13.9 13.38 14.2 13.53 
  F 15.6 19.1 17.13 17.2 16.74 17.8 17.7 17.7 16.00 18.2 17.14 
Source: INSSE 
 
Fig. 7. Dependency rate (contributors / pensioners)
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WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT 
Improve the dependency rate 
Worrying as the deteriorating demographic dependency rate might 
be over the longer term, the current problems of the social security 
system – primarily pensions – come from the low number of 
contributors. The official retiring age is supposed to raise over the next 
13 to 15 years from 62 for men, and 57 for women, to 65 for all. We 
have however to bear in mind that Romanian pensioners are relatively 
young, many of them retiring before the official age, either on medical 
grounds, or under different early retirement schemes. These practices 
have to be curbed, and the alleged corruption associated with many 
medical retirement / disability benefits decisions stamped out for the 
effects of the law to really bear fruits.  
The key element, however, is the incentives people face. Good 
government policies should to determine them to work (and 
contribute) longer, cater more for their own needs, and rely less on 
public schemes vulnerable to free riding and political risk. Generally, 
this can be achieved by linking closer the level of benefits to the 
contributions paid in the system. In the case of pensions, a system 
based on capitalization would provide the right incentives. The 
government is unfortunately moving slowly to enact a questionable 
volunteer supplementary occupational private pension, risky because 
of its dependence on the fate of the employer company, and under 
undue trade union influence. The more sustainable World Bank 
supported compulsory funded scheme looks to have been 
abandoned. Similarly, in the case of healthcare, supplementary 
private insurance, or even (tax free) health saving accounts might do 
the trick. Providing tax incentives for pensioners who continue to work 
post retirement (e.g. part time) might also encourage some of the 
‘young’ Romanian retirees to return to employment.  
Improve the fertility rate 
As mentioned earlier in the article, we remain skeptical that the choice 
of families to have children could easily be influenced by public policy 
– at least in a democracy. An improved economic climate will go 
some way towards achieving this objective. The government intends 
to gradually increase the amount of child benefit, to up to 10% of the 
net average wage. This is welcome from the perspective of fighting 
poverty. In Romania, the number of children is the best predictor of a 
family leaving in poverty. An increase in the value of the child benefit 
will go a long way towards improving the fate of children from poor 
families. Encouraging poor people to have more children is however a 
questionable policy. Educational attainment of children is correlated 
with that of parents. The proper policy objective is to determine better 
educated, better earning people to establish a family. As we have 
discussed above, it is exactly this type of people who postpone having 
children. It is unlikely that the flat rate child benefit would have any 
impact on the decisions made by this category. Conversely, higher 
earning mothers will be negatively affected by the introduction next 
year of the (low) flat rate maternal benefit. Moreover, the reforms of 
The real 
problem (high 
dependency 
ratio) is due 
to poor 
government 
policies, not 
demographic 
trends 
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the education system have gradually eliminated in the last years the 
extra-curricular services provided in the few number of schools where 
they had survived the early years of transition (such as catered meals 
or partial after-class boarding). It is precisely such services which were 
extremely helpful for working mothers, who many times lack time more 
than they lack money to contribute to their financing. On balance, the 
government policy does not seem sensible or very coherent, as it 
overall discourages higher earning women from becoming mothers, 
strengthening an already manifest natural (negative) trend.  
Another questionable government policy is the planned introduction 
of supplementary benefits for single mothers. It is obvious that women 
who raise their children alone are in a more vulnerable situation, both 
in terms of their own welfare, and that of the children. There are 
however serious reasons to question this approach. On one hand, the 
demographic statistics have shown that, as people postpone or refrain 
from marriage, up to a third of couples will not choose to legalize their 
relationship. Therefore, using as proxy the status of a woman might fail 
to identify the actual single mothers. On the other hand, tying a 
benefit to the unmarried status of the woman might have the self-
defeating consequence of encouraging the recipients to refrain from 
marrying, and thus preserving their vulnerability.  
Emigration  
Statistics show that the emigration flow has thinned lately. The lifting of 
visa requirements for EU did not result in a huge flux, and most of those 
who leave engage in circulatory, seasonal migration. These are 
however the legal emigrants. Illegal migration can not be measured 
exactly, but it is estimated to be large.  
This apparent calm might be challenged by the accession to the 
European Union. It will, especially after the full liberalization of the free 
movement of laborers, drastically improve the mobility of Romanian 
workers. Those most likely to benefit will again be the younger, and 
better educated, who possess the necessary language skills. Their 
emigration will pose many problems for the Romanian society. In spite 
of the public discourse on the need to create a better environment for 
the (re)integration of the most intellectually gifted Romanian youths, 
many of whom return home from scholarships abroad to face an 
unknown future, little has been achieved so far. The integration in EU 
will raise the challenge for the Romanian society to find the incentives 
to keep home its more gifted and mobile members.  
Cope with an over bloated rural sector 
The gravest challenge for the European integration of Romania is 
however the huge proportion of the rural population. The reversed 
migration from town to village has been a strategy to cope with the 
dislocations produced by the transition, by taking refuge in the 
cheaper (and only partly money based), slow path rural economy, 
dominated by ‘survival agriculture’. It is extremely worrying that this 
phenomenon has gathered pace after 1997, when for the first time the 
overall trend of internal migration was away from cities, and into rural 
areas (see Fig. 10).  
People need to 
face the right 
incentives – to 
stay in (or return 
to) Romania, and 
work longer 
 R O M A N I A N  A C A D E M I C  S O C I E T Y  ( S A R )  
 
 
 38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poverty is endemic in the rural areas. The Romanian village trails the 
town on practically any human development indicator. The 
improvement of the economic environment will also help to reverse 
the flow of internal migration, back from village to town. The share of 
the rural population will however remain considerable for many years 
to come. Rural development is going to be a challenge for the 
Romanian government. The pressure will grow once the country is 
integrated in the European Union. The rather backward Romanian 
agriculture will have difficulties when fully exposed to the European 
competition. On the other hand, the very large number of Romanian 
farmers will represent a growing burden on the intervention 
mechanisms of the Common Agricultural Policy, which seem to move 
away form subsidizing agricultural output, and towards income 
support for individual farmers.  
ConclusionS and Recommendations 
• The results of the census have been a shock to the public opinion. 
The drop in the number of population was larger than expected. 
Behind the light catching numbers, there are more real and serious 
challenges. An improved economy will positively affect all of them, 
but special policy interventions will be needed also. Demographic 
trends have deep seated causes, and they are not very 
susceptible to the intervention tools open to a democratic 
government, which will have only a marginal success at best.  
• The drop in population numbers is not an evil in itself, and 
theoretically could even have beneficial consequences. Romanian 
population is still relatively young when compared with both EU 
countries, and our CEE neighbors. The severe Romanian problem of 
the economic dependency ratio has been induced more by 
policy, than by demographics. The government should encourage 
Fig. 10 Internal migration due to permanent residence change
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people to retire later, and to rely more on their savings (under 
different forms) to cater for their needs. Unfortunately the creation 
of the private pension system is not on government agenda. Its 
preferred option of occupational pensions presents considerable 
risks, and since it is strictly volunteer will have a much reduced 
appeal. In the health field, supplementary health insurance (which 
is under consideration), and health saving accounts could offer a 
way forward 
• The decline in the fertility rates is a general European phenomenon, 
and is likely to stay with us. The government is devising a number of 
policy initiatives (increased child benefits, and special benefits for 
single mothers) which are supposed to alleviate the problem. These 
policies are however better suited for poverty alleviation (and even 
that is questionable for the second one). The real problem is that 
more affluent people refrain from having children, and for them the 
government policy is more a deterrent (i.e. the introduction of the 
flat rate maternal benefit, instead of the earnings related one).  
• Emigration appears to be kept in check. The forthcoming 
accession to EU will however open the opportunity to emigrate to 
many of the younger and better educated people the country 
can ill-afford to lose. The government needs to device a policy 
devised to this more mobile minority.  
• The continuous ruralization of Romania is the consequence of a 
deeply non-functional economy / society. The EU integration will 
force us to face this challenge sooner rather than later. While an 
improving economic climate may stop and the trend may even 
reverse, the problem posed by the huge underdeveloped rural 
population will be with us for many years to come. The 
development of rural Romania is one of the most serious challenges 
for any Romanian government, and despite funds to address it 
flowing from various organizations, no comprehensive strategy was 
yet produced. The government should create a pool of interested 
parties, business organizations and think-tanks to work jointly on 
producing such a strategy, submit it to the public debate and use it 
as the main basis on negotiating Agriculture and Regional 
Development with the European Union. 
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